Petitions to watch | Conference of April 27
on Apr 26, 2018 at 7:07 pm
In its conference of April 27, 2018, the court will consider petitions involving issues such as whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the double jeopardy clause; whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from charging, convicting and sentencing a person who has already been charged, convicted and sentenced in the court of a state for much of the same conduct; and whether, pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., the Supreme Court should vacate the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s judgment and instruct that court to remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss all claims for prospective relief regarding pregnant unaccompanied minors.
Issues: (1) Whether the petitioner’s mandatory guidelines sentence, which was enhanced under the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, and, if so, whether a conviction for burglary of a dwelling under Florida law qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s elements clause; and (2) whether published orders issued by a circuit court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), and in the context of applications to file second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions, constitute binding precedent outside of that context.
Issue: Whether, pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., the Supreme Court should vacate the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s judgment and instruct that court to remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss all claims for prospective relief regarding pregnant unaccompanied minors.
Issue: Whether the “separate sovereign” concept actually exists when Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes and the general erosion of any real tribal sovereignty is amplified by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s constitution in such a way that the petitioner’s prosecutions in both tribal and federal court violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
Issues: (1) Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are competent to manage his condition and that procedure will go as intended; (2) whether evidence comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the risks they pose to the inmate; and (3) whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition.
Issue: Whether the death penalty, in and of itself, violates the Eighth Amendment in light of contemporary standards of decency and the geographic arbitrariness of its imposition.
Issue: Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the double jeopardy clause.
Issue: Whether, under the Supreme Court’s opinions in United States v. Booker, Johnson v. United States and Beckles v. United States, which depended heavily upon the distinction between advisory and mandatory sentencing schemes, the residual clause of the mandatory sentencing guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether, when a criminal defendant has already been convicted of an offense in a state criminal proceeding, the United States may thereafter prosecute the defendant for the same offense without violating the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether, under the Supreme Court’s opinions in United States v. Booker, Johnson v. United States and Beckles v. United States, which depended heavily upon the distinction between advisory and mandatory sentencing schemes, the residual clause of the mandatory sentencing guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues: (1) Whether incarcerating a prisoner awaiting execution for over four decades, even after the state found a life-without-parole sentence to be appropriate, violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose; and (2) whether incarcerating a prisoner awaiting execution for over four decades, with over half that time attributable to repeated constitutional violations in a succession of sentencing hearings, violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose.
Issue: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act forecloses a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements.
Issues: (1) Whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from charging, convicting and sentencing a person who has already been charged, convicted and sentenced in the court of a state for much of the same conduct; and (2) whether the seriousness of the offense conduct is an appropriate consideration for a district court when fashioning a sentence on revocation of supervised release.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit’s holding—granting qualified immunity to law-enforcement officers who stopped the petitioner from praying silently in her own home because there was no prior case law involving similar facts—conflicts with Hope v. Pelzer, which “expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be ‘fundamentally similar’” or involve “‘materially similar’ facts.”
Issue: Whether—when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit found that the new mitigating evidence discovered on federal habeas review was “double-edged” and could not outweigh the substantial aggravating evidence, and when it misapplied the standard for evaluating prejudice in a Wiggins claim—it denied the petitioner due process.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the double jeopardy clause.
In its conference of April 27, 2018, the court will also consider petitions involving issues related to Sessions v. Dimaya such as whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague; whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is unconstitutionally vague; and whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issue: Whether — after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “violent felony” definition to be unconstitutionally vague — 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague when it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred when it denied a certificate of appealability regarding petitioner’s claim that the definition of a “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issue: Whether — after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “violent felony” definition to be unconstitutionally vague — 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague when it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3); and (3) whether a prior Texas conviction for burglary is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred when it denied a certificate of appealability regarding petitioner’s claim that the definition of a “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit erred when it denied a certificate of appealability regarding petitioner’s claim that the definition of a “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States.
Issues: (1) Whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery has as an element “the use … of physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A); and (3) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals fo the 11th Circuit’s rule that reasonable jurists could not debate an issue foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, even when a judge on the panel issued the binding precedent and subsequently stated that the panel’s decision may be erroneous, misapplies the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell and Buck v. Davis for determining whether a movant has made the threshold showing for a certificate of appealability.
Issue: Whether — after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “violent felony” definition to be unconstitutionally vague — 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague when it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issue: Whether the definition of the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and (2) whether evading arrest with a motor vehicle is a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
Issue: Whether — after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “violent felony” definition to be unconstitutionally vague — 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague when it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issue: Whether the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues: (1) Whether the federal generic aggravated-assault offense requires more than a showing of mere recklessness for conviction; and (2) whether the definition of an “aggravated felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether — after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, which held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “violent felony” definition to be unconstitutionally vague — 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague when it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issues: (1) Whether the analysis of whether a predicate act constitutes a “crime of violence” under the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) must comport with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 7th and 9th Circuits have held, in conflict with the rulings of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 6th, 8th and 11th Circuits; and (2) whether the “ordinary case” methodology survived Johnson v. United States for purposes of statutes other than the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States.
Issue: Whether the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as applied to the definition of an aggravated felony in the Immigration and Naturalization Act, is constitutional.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it requires application of an indeterminate risk standard to the “ordinary case” of an individual’s prior conviction.
Issues: (1) Whether all facts that increase a defendant’s statutory maximum, including the fact of a prior conviction, must be pleaded in the indictment and either admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the Supreme Court should hold this petition for certiorari pending a decision in Sessions v. Dimaya.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether, following Johnson v. United States, in which the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, identical language in the residual clause of the previously-mandatory sentencing guidelines is likewise unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, in the context of a challenge to the “aggravated felony” enhancement under Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing a noncitizen’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the definition of the term “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit erred when it affirmed the exclusion of the petitioner’s expert rebuttal testimony regarding his future dangerousness in violation of Kelly v. South Carolina, which recognized a capital defendant’s broad due process right to rebut any “implication” or “inference” of dangerousness “from the [government’s] evidence,” and misread the record, which plainly shows that the petitioner’s expert testimony would have rebutted not only the government’s evidence but also its summation arguments; and (2) whether, after the Supreme Court invalidated the definition of a “violent felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act in Johnson v. United States, the definition of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether a certificate of appealability should be granted to resolve a circuit split regarding whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether the definition of the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether the definition of the term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.
Issue: Whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States.
