Brothers in Law is a recurring series by brothers Akhil and Vikram Amar, with special emphasis on measuring what the Supreme Court says against what the Constitution itself says. For more content from Akhil and Vikram, please see Akhil’s free weekly podcast, “Amarica’s Constitution,” Vikram’s regular columns on Justia, and Akhil’s new book, Born Equal: Remaking America’s Constitution, 1840-1920.

Put aside, for a moment, all the ways that President Donald Trump’s attempted redefinition of birthright citizenship in his executive order 14160 violates the plain letter and obvious spirit of the 14th Amendment. Bracket, for now, the Trump order’s incompatibility with the Supreme Court’s landmark 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and indeed with every ruling of every notable American court ever to rule on birthright citizenship. Forget, for argument’s sake, Trump’s mercurial repudiation of what every post-Civil War president – including Trump himself, in his first term – has ever done when encountering babies born on American soil under the American flag to foreign parents who themselves are neither U.S. citizens nor green-card holders.

Focus instead, for just a few minutes, on 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), part of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which has remained on the books for nearly three quarters of a century. It states: “The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”

Next week’s argument in Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction involves a technical question about bankruptcy procedure – the standards for overlooking the failure of a debtor in bankruptcy to mention one of its assets to the court.

To give context, the debtor is Thomas Keathley, who with his spouse filed for bankruptcy in Arkansas in December 2019. The bankruptcy court approved a plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, obligating the Keathleys to repay their creditors out of future income; the plan promised payment of 100% of their debts, albeit without interest. Later, while the Keathleys were making payments on the plan, a truck driven by an employee of Buddy Ayers Construction struck Keathley’s car, injuring him seriously. Although a lay person might regard the accident as an unfortunate incident, bankruptcy law regards the accident as a benefit to Keathley’s creditors, because it gives him a claim against Buddy Ayers that could produce money for those creditors.

The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has “relisted” for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here.

There are 261 petitions and applications teed up for this Friday’s conference. Seventeen are familiar faces making return appearances on the relist stage, joined by four newcomers trying to break into the rotation. The lineup this week includes a RICO class-action that asks how many uninjured plaintiffs are too many, a capital case about whether harmless-error review can rely on evidence the jury never saw, and a qualified-immunity dispute featuring the wrong tear-gas round at the wrong time.

ScotusCrim is a recurring series by Rory Little focusing on intersections between the Supreme Court and criminal law.

The first sentence of Article II of the Constitution introduces the executive branch by announcing that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President.” In recent years, many scholars and judges have focused on the singular “a” in this “vesting clause” to assert a broad and deep – indeed, sometimes unreviewable – “unitary executive” power in the president.

Why isn’t Article III read similarly? The first sentence likewise introduces the judicial branch by announcing that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court” (and then continues to say “and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). Might not the Constitution’s singular text here (“one supreme Court”) describe a similarly strong, even unreviewable, “unitary judicial” power in the Supreme Court?

Immigration Matters is a recurring series by César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández that analyzes the court’s immigration docket, highlighting emerging legal questions about new policy and enforcement practices.

Requests for asylum typically include complex descriptions of violence and fear followed by flight to the United States. In immigration courts, it falls on immigration judges to decide whether the facts on the ground are what the asylum applicant claims them to be. If they are, immigration judges must determine whether immigration law extends safe harbor to the applicant. Earlier this month, a unanimous Supreme Court decided, in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, that federal appellate courts must defer to immigration judges and their colleagues who hear appeals. Although that decision may sound somewhat technical, it has major consequences: The court’s decision puts more responsibility on decision-makers who are stretched thin by mounting caseloads, while making it more difficult for migrants to ask federal appellate courts to overturn asylum denials.