Petitions to watch | Conference of October 13
on Oct 12, 2017 at 11:39 am
In its conference of October 13, 2017, the court will consider petitions involving issues such as whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s territorial jurisdiction; whether Minnesota statute Section 211B.11, which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment; and whether the free speech clause or the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising
Issue: Whether a legislatively mandated permit condition is subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as set out in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, Dolan v. City of Tigard and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.
Issues: (1) Whether a determination that a law is content-based leaves room for a court to apply something less than strict scrutiny, specifically (a) whether the court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert establishes a bright-line rule for content-based speech, (b) whether content-based, compelled speech is subject to lower scrutiny if it is deemed to be an abortion-related disclosure, and (c) whether the First Amendment permits lower scrutiny for content-based restrictions on professional speech or professional facilities; and (2) whether a law requiring religious non-profits to post a government message antithetical to their beliefs triggers heightened or minimal scrutiny under the free exercise clause.
Issue: Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the double jeopardy clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal.
Issue: Whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520, requires suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a wiretap order that is facially insufficient because the order exceeds the judge’s territorial jurisdiction.
Issues: (1) Whether the Supreme Court’s precedents clearly establish that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed for a murder because he does not remember or acknowledge committing it; and (2) whether the state court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that Madison was competent to be executed.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit exceeded the proper scope of federal habeas review by setting aside a state criminal sentence based on a putative federal due-process right to specific performance of a plea agreement that was superseded and withdrawn, in accordance with state law, before the entry of judgment.
Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred, in conflict with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd and 4th Circuits, in holding that the petitioners can be compelled to advertise free or low-cost abortion services to all clients; and (2) whether the 9th Circuit erred in not applying strict scrutiny to a law that compels speech and is content-based, in conflict with the decisional law of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Minnesota statute Section 211B.11, which broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place, is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
Issue: Whether the free speech clause or the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising.
Issue: Whether, under the “rule of reason,” the government’s showing that American Express’ anti-steering provisions stifle price competition on the merchant side of the credit-card platform suffices to prove anti-competitive effects and thereby shifts to American Express the burden of establishing any pro-competitive benefits from the provisions.
Issues: (1) Whether, when a Florida jury recommended a death sentence prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, and the jury didn’t make any of the findings required by Hurst, the error can be deemed harmless under Chapman v. California, or whether the jury’s recommendation is insufficient to constitute a jury verdict as required by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) whether, when the jury was repeatedly advised by the court that its advisory sentencing recommendation was non-binding, the death-sentencing procedures in this case complied with the Eighth Amendment.
Issues: (1) Whether deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is owed to an interpretation of language prohibiting billboards that display “flashing,” “intermittent” or “moving” lights, contained in agreements between the Federal Highway Administration and individual states, as announced in a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA on September 25, 2007, or whether deference, if any, is owed under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.; and (2) whether the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which invoked Chevron and approved the FHWA’s interpretation, conflicts with Chevron itself.
Issue: Whether Missouri’s second-degree burglary statute is divisible into two offenses with separate elements for the purpose of analyzing whether a conviction under that statute qualifies as a conviction for a “violent felony” as defined in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Issues: (1) Whether reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court’s rejection of Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion, and, accordingly, whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability; (2) whether, given Petitioner’s credible evidence that a juror voted for the death penalty because he is a “nigger,” the lower court erred in ruling that he failed to make “a substantial showing of the of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); and (3) whether Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado created a new constitutional claim, and, if not, whether the lower courts erred in denying Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
Issues: (1) Whether, when a Florida jury recommended a death sentence before the Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida and none of the findings required by Hurst were made, the error can be deemed harmless under Chapman v. California, or whether the recommendation simply does not amount to the jury verdict the Sixth Amendment requires; and (2) whether the death-sentencing procedures in this case complied with the Eighth Amendment, when the jury was repeatedly advised by the court that its advisory sentencing recommendation was nonbinding.
Issue: Whether a United States provider of email services must comply with a probable-cause-based warrant issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by making disclosure in the United States of electronic communications within that provider’s control, even if the provider has decided to store that material abroad.
