Minnesota: Teague retroactivity rule binds states
on Apr 19, 2007 at 12:54 pm
The state of Minnesota argued in a Supreme Court filing on Thursday that states are not free to give more liberal retroactivity in state cases to criminal law decisions of the Supreme Court. The states are bound by the federal retroactivity standard the Court laid down in Teague v. Lane in 1989, Minnesota contended in its response to a query from the Court on March 20 in the case of Danforth v. Minnesota (06-8273). This blog discussed the Court’s question to Minnesota in this post.
The issue arises in a case in which Minnesota prisoner Stephen Danforth wants to take advantage — under state law — of a Supreme Court ruling that the Justices have said does not apply retroactively under the Teague approach. The precedent at issue is Crawford v. Washington, a 2004 ruling limiting use at trial of out-of-court “testimonial statements” that had not been subject to cross-examination. On Feb. 28, in the case of Whorton v. Bockting (05-595), the Justices ruled that decision did not apply retroactively.
Stephen Danforth’s public defender lawyers have argued that, if the retroactivity question is governed not by Teague but by Minnesota law, Danforth would be able to take advantage of the Crawford rule in his criminal sexual conduct case involving a six-year-old boy; his conviction became final no later than 1999. That is the claim that prompted the Court to ask for the state’s views.
In a brief (available for download here), Minnesota echoed the views of its state Supreme Court. A state court, state lawyers said, “when asked to determine the retroactive application of a new federal rule on collateral review, must follow the principles of Teague.” Retroactivity of such rules “is a federal question and is governed by federal law,” the state’s response said, contending that the Court has said so repeatedly.
It serves federal uniformity and “principles of judicial federalism” to have a single national standard for determining, in habeas cases, the application of a new criminal law ruling to cases that became final previousl, according to the brief.
“The goal of uniformity is defeated if defendants in states granting retroactivity can use a new federal rule to attack their convictions on collateral review while defendants in states that follow Teague (and federal defendants) do not enjoy this potential benefit,” the brief asserted. The need for uniformity “is just as compelling in a state collateral ttack as it is a federal habeas proceeding,” it added. “A state cannot use state law to expand the scope of a federal constitutional decision,” according to the brief.
If a state court does want to make a federal constitutional rule applicable in state cases, Minnesota suggested, “it is free to adopt the ruling as a a matter of state law and to apply the state decision retroactively without federal interference.” Stephen Danforth would have been free, it said, to ask the state Supreme Court to adopt Crawford as a matter of state constitutional law, but he did not do so.
While conceding that there is a split among state courts on the question at issue, Minnesota said that the division “is not as profound or dire” as Danforth contends. The vast majority of states apply Teague on the retroactively of federal criminal decisions, it said. Only a few jurisdictions disagree, it added.
Even if the Court were to leave states free to fashion their own retroactivity approaches to federal decisions, the state argued, Danforth would not benefit because it Minnesota law follows Teague in post-conviction attacks on state convictions.
The Danforth case has not been scheduled for Conference of the Justices.
