Argument Preview: Winkelman v. Parma City School District on 2/27

The following argument preview is by Molly Cutler of the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.

On February 27, 2007, the Court will hear Winkelman v. Parma City School District, which asks whether the non-lawyer parents of a disabled child can appear pro se in federal court either on their own behalf or on behalf of the child in a lawsuit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Jean-Claude Andre of Los Angeles will argue on behalf of the petitioners. Assistant to the Solicitor General David Salmons will argue on behalf of the United States as amicus in support of petitioners. Pierre Bergeron of Cincinnati, Ohio will argue on behalf of the respondent school district. The parties’ briefs are available here; the brief of the United States is available here.

The IDEA provides federal grants to states to assist in the education of disabled children. A state participating in the program must ensure that each child receives a “free appropriate public education,” including special education and other services necessary to meet that child’s needs, by developing an individualized education program (IEP) for each disabled child in collaboration with parents or guardians. Under the statute, parents have the right to challenge an IEP in an administrative due process hearing and a right to appeal the findings of such a hearing to the state educational agency. After exhausting administrative remedies, “any party aggrieved” by the findings of the administrative proceedings has the right to bring a civil action in federal court.

Jacob Winkelman is a nine-year-old boy with autism. His parents, petitioners Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, challenged Parma City School District’s proposed IEP for Jacob, which would have placed him in special education classes at a public elementary school. After exhausting their administrative remedies under the IDEA, the Winkelmans filed an action in federal district court on behalf of both themselves and Jacob, alleging that the school district had violated the IDEA’s procedural and substantive requirements and seeking reimbursement for the cost of enrolling Jacob at a private school specializing in educating children with autism. When the district court granted judgment in favor of the school district, the Winkelmans filed a pro se appeal. Holding that parents are prohibited from proceeding pro se on both substantive and procedural claims, the Sixth Circuit ordered the appeal dismissed unless the Winkelmans retained counsel within thirty days. Instead, the Winkelmans secured a stay from the Supreme Court and then filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court subsequently granted.

The Winkelmans argue that the text and structure of the IDEA demonstrate that parents are “part[ies] aggrieved” when they bring a civil action to enforce substantive or procedural rights under the IDEA. Because it is undisputed that parents are “part[ies] aggrieved” for the purposes of administrative appeals under the statute, they argue, well-established principles of statutory construction require interpreting that phrase to have the same meaning in the section authorizing a civil action. Further, the Winkelmans claim, Congress emphasized that parents should not be required to bear the cost of educating a disabled child, demonstrating that parents share with their child a substantive right to a free appropriate public education under the IDEA that they can seek to enforce in federal court.

The school district, by contrast, argues that the Court should infer an intent to prohibit parents from proceeding pro se in civil actions from Congress’s decision to remain silent about the right of parents in civil actions while expressly permitting parents to prosecute administrative appeals pro se. The district points out that its position is consistent with a traditional common law ban on non-attorney parents representing their child in court. Moreover, it emphasizes, it is not in the best interests of minors to be represented by non-attorneys. It further argues that the statute’s plain language demonstrates that the IDEA was intended to protect children rather than their parents, who have only a narrow set of procedural rights designed to facilitate enforcement of the child’s rights. Finally, the district argues that permitting parents to prosecute their child’s claims pro se in federal court would violate the “clear notice” requirement that legislation passed pursuant to the Spending Clause requires Congress to spell out in clear and unequivocal language all conditions, obligations, or liabilities imposed on the states.

In its amicus brief, the United States argues not only that there is no practical reason to believe that Congress would permit parents to proceed pro se in administrative proceedings but not in federal court, but also that the Court should not distinguish between procedural and substantive rights for the purposes of permitting parents to proceed pro se, because those rights are inextricably intertwined under IDEA.