Argument Preview: Wallace v. Chicago Police Officers on 11/6

The following argument preview was written by Jameson Jones, a student in the Stanford Supreme Court Litigation Clinic.

On Monday, November 6, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Wallace v. Chicago Police Officers (No. 05-1240). The Court granted cert. on the limited question of when a “claim for damages arising out of a false arrest or other search or seizure forbidden by the Fourth Amendment accrues when the fruits of the search were introduced in the claimant’s criminal trial and he was convicted?” Kenneth Flaxman will argue on behalf of the petitioner, and Benna Ruth Solomon, Deputy Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, will argue for the respondent police officers. The briefs for the parties are available here.

In 1994, petitioner Andre Wallace was taken in for questioning related to the murder of John Handy, was questioned throughout the night, and ultimately confessed to the murder. Over objections that he was arrested without probable cause and that the confession was coerced in violation of his Miranda rights, Wallace was convicted of first-degree murder. The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter held that Wallace was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the police officers lacked probable cause. The court remanded for a hearing and, in a subsequent appeal, held that the confession was insufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest to permit its use in court. On April 10, 2002, the prosecution dropped the case. Over the course of the trial and appeal process, petitioner was incarcerated for a little more than eight years. On April 2, 2003, Wallace filed a Section 1983 claim for damages stemming from the false arrest.

This case centers on the question of when a Section 1983 suit for damages arising from a Fourth Amendment violation can be brought. If such claims accrue at the point of the violation (here, the unlawful arrest), petitioner’s suit for damages is barred by the Illinois statute of limitations. However, if these claims accrue when criminal charges are dismissed, then petitioner’s suit was timely and should be allowed to proceed. A previous Supreme Court case, Heck v. Humphrey, bars litigants from bringing Section 1983 suits if the claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.” Because a Fourth Amendment violation will only undermine the viability of a prosecution or conviction in certain circumstances (depending upon the availability of untainted evidence or the applicability of attenuation, inevitable discovery, or independent source doctrines), Heck’s application here is contested. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Diane Wood, articulated the need for a clear rule and held that all Fourth Amendment damages actions accrue at the time of the constitutional violation. Judge Richard Posner, in a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, argued that “a civil rights suit is not a permissible vehicle for a collateral attack on a conviction.” He said that the panel’s rule was not actually clear because “the tough cases” would “simply be fought out as equitable-tolling cases.” Judge Posner’s proposed rule would presume that a Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim accrued at the point of injury, but would allow the plaintiff to rebut this presumption by showing that the only evidence of guilt was attained through a constitutional violation.

Petitioner contends that Fourth Amendment causes of action for false arrest should accrue when criminal charges are dismissed. Because the only significant evidence of guilt admitted in petitioner’s trial was the unconstitutionally obtained confession, success on his Section 1983 claim would necessarily have implied the invalidity of his conviction. Under Heck, therefore, petitioner argues that his claim could not have accrued until the prosecution dropped the charges after his success on appeal. Petitioner also claims that he was subject to a “continuing seizure” throughout his period of incarceration, and thus accrual would be inappropriate until his release. He also argues that the Seventh Circuit’s rule would lead to innumerable false arrest claims during pending criminal prosecutions and that these claims would cause friction between federal and state courts.

Respondents argue that petitioner’s “continuing seizure” theory is erroneous because the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unconstitutional searches and seizures, not unwarranted prosecutions. Once criminal defendants are arraigned, they are held pursuant to court process, and are no longer subject merely to police custody. Petitioner’s allegations for damages over the eight years of incarceration are furthermore irrelevant to accrual, because the constitutional harm occurred at a distinct point in time and continuing consequences cannot alter the point at which an injury occurred. Respondents also argue that the presence or absence of a subsequent prosecution is irrelevant to the accrual of Fourth Amendment claims: a civil rights plaintiff has a right to recover damages at the time of the false arrest, regardless of whether charges are ever filed. Respondents also argue that collateral attacks from parallel litigation of constitutional claims are better handled through the doctrines of abstention and preclusion rather than through manipulation of accrual rules. Furthermore, even under petitioner’s more flexible accrual rule, respondents argue that careful plaintiffs would still be forced to file suits at the time of the arrest because they cannot know ex ante whether their particular Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily undermine their prosecution or conviction.

Several states submitted an amicus brief supporting the respondents, arguing that governments have a “powerful interest in timely notice of alleged misconduct by their agents.” Additionally, the National League of Cities (along with other municipal and county organizations) filed an amicus brief that further describes the significant burdens on the administration of justice that would result if accrual is based on a case-by-case evaluation.

Prediction: I think petitioner’s “continuing seizure” argument will be a nonstarter for this Court. Although the potential conflict between federal courts and state criminal proceedings may make the ultimate question of accrual a close one, I think the Court will side with the respondents out of a desire for a clear rule upon which litigants can rely.