More on Today’s Opinion in Samson v. California

By Kevin Russell
on Jun 19, 2006 at 9:03 pm

David Jakhelln, a summer associate at Akin Gump, has this summary of today’s opinion in Samson:

Just how conditional is the liberty of a parolee under the Fourth Amendment? In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Court ruled today that, when it is permitted by statute, a suspicionless search of a parolee is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

While walking down a California street with a woman and a small child on a September afternoon in 2002, parolee Donald C. Samson was approached by Officer Alex Rohleder. Rohleder had no reason to believe that Samson was engaged in any criminal activity, but he decided to search Samson anyway pursuant to a state statute. Officer Rohleder patted down Samson, found a cigarette package, looked inside, and found methamphetamines. After being charged with possession, Samson moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court denied Samson’s motion, and the appellate court upheld the ruling. The California Supreme Court denied Samson’s petition for review. In the view of the lower courts, Samson’s status as a parolee determined the resolution of his Fourth Amendment challenge: in 1996, the California legislature responded to a perceived problem of high recidivism and insufficient supervision of the large parolee population within the state by granting to parole and police officers the power to conduct suspicionless searches of any parolee. The California Supreme Court ruled, in People v. Reyes, that these suspicionless searches were constitutional, so long as they were not “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.” The trial court held, and the appellate court agreed, that there was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or harassing about Rohleder’s search of Samson. The Supreme Court granted cert. to determine whether suspicionless searches of parolees are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.

The Court ruled that under the “totality of the circumstances,” the suspicionless search of Samson was reasonable under the balancing test set forth in United States v. Knights, a similar case involving a probationer. There the Court explained that the individual’s privacy must be balanced against the “promotion of legitimate governmental interests” in determining the reasonableness of the search.

Noting that parole is a state-imposed punishment served in lieu of prison and that violation of the terms of parole may result in imprisonment, Justice Thomas explained that parolees’ reasonable expectations of privacy must therefore be substantially reduced. Unlike other citizens, parolees are subject to extensive state supervision, including prohibitions on travel, firearms ownership, alcohol consumption, and the like. Moreover, the parolee in California is required to acknowledge in writing before release from prison that she will be subject to suspicionless searches.

On the other side of the balance, the Court found the state interest in preventing recidivism to be “substantial,” even “overwhelming.” Because parolees present such a high risk for engaging in criminal activity, the court found it reasonable to use suspicionless searches – and the element of surprise they provide – to more effectively supervise parolees. Yet California’s discretion is not unlimited. Thomas noted that the state’s prohibition on “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” searches would guard against capricious enforcement. It is not clear, however, that such a limitation is required by the Fourth Amendment under the Court’s ruling today.

In a feisty dissent, Justice Stevens argued that sanctioning a regime of suspicionless searches permits “the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp out.” Noting that the Court had previously sanctioned suspicionless searches only in the case of “special needs” exceptions to the general interest in law enforcement, Justice Stevens assailed the Court for creating a category of constitutionally sanctioned suspicionless searches “unsupported by any special need” and without protections against the state’s unfettered discretion.

For Justice Stevens, the real problem with the court’s decision was that it equated the parolee’s Fourth Amendment liberties with that of the prisoner, who arguably has none, rather than that of the probationer, whose rights are merely diminished. Justice Stevens believed that, as with the probationer in Knights, reasonable suspicion is the minimal standard required under the Fourth Amendment for searches of parolees. This is doubly so because the curtailment of the prisoner’s Fourth Amendment rights are justified only by the special institutional needs presented by confinement – needs which are notably absent when the prisoner becomes the parolee.

The question that remains unanswered after today’s opinion is just how far the state may go in conducting suspicionless searches before running afoul of the “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” standard or other constitutional limitations. An answer to that question, and the impact of this case will have on the gathering of DNA samples, await another day.