Monday’s Argument in Rice v. Collins

In a follow-up to the Court’s decision last term in Miller-El, Rice v. Collins presents the issue of what standard of review federal courts must apply to a determination of the facts by a state court in federal habeas corpus cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In particular, the case requires the Court to answer the question whether a federal court may ever reject the presumption of correctness for state-court fact-finding as an unreasonable determination of the facts, even if a rational factfinder could have determined the facts as the state court did.

The Court will hear oral arguments in the case on Monday, December 5. California Attorney General William Lockyer will argue for petitioner. Mark Drozdowski, Deputy Federal Public Defender, will argue on behalf of Steven Collins. The parties’ briefs are available here.

In 1996, California police arrested respondent Steven Collins and discovered 0.10 grams of rock cocaine in his possession. Because Collins had been convicted of two prior felonies, the State charged him as a recidivist under California’s Three Strikes Law. At trial, the judge conducted voir dire and subsequently asked counsel to exercise their preemptory challenges. Of the three prospective African-American jurors out of a pool of twenty-three, the prosecutor struck two, both women. The prosecutor also struck two white prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor had impermissibly exercised the challenges against the two African-American women on account of their race in violation of Batson. Finding a prima facie Batson violation, the judge asked the prosecutor to explain her reasons for the challenges. The prosecutor claimed that one woman, Juror 16, had responded to a question by the judge in a flippant manner, and that the other, Juror 19, had a daughter with a drug problem. In addition, the prosecutor responded that both women were young (even though Juror 19 was not), potentially too tolerant of drug possession, single, and without ties to their community. Upon further questioning, the prosecutor acknowledged that gender may have played a role. When chastised for using gender as a factor, the prosecutor returned to her explanation that youth was important, even though other young jurors were allowed to serve.

The trial judge, noting that he was “prepared to give the district attorney the benefit of the doubt,” refused to find a Batson violation. With regard to Juror 19, the court was satisfied with the prosecutor’s explanation that she had a family member with a drug problem. With regard to Juror 16, the court held that, although it had not observed the demeanor complained of, it was justified to excuse the potential juror for her alleged reaction to a question by the judge. It is unclear whether the trial court accepted the youth justification legitimate, as it noted the explanation that Juror 16 was young, but noted that other prospective jurors were as well.

On appeal, Collins challenged only the strike of Juror 16. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that youth is not a forbidden class for purposes of Batson, and that in any event the prosecutor also relied on the juror’s demeanor. Collins filed a petition for review in the state Supreme Court, which was denied without comment. Proceeding pro se, Collins then sought federal habeas relief. He offered no new evidence, and the district court held that neither purported justification constituted mere pretext. The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, then reversed, holding that the California Court of Appeal’s decision represented an unreasonable determination of the facts and was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In the Supreme Court, California now challenges the standard of review used by the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner frames its argument by reviewing the historical deference to state courts’ resolution of factual questions in habeas cases. Petitioner notes that, even before AEDPA, the Court explained in Marshall v. Lonberger that deference requires a federal habeas court to do more than simply disagree with a state court before rejecting its factual determinations. Petitioner also reviews Jackson v. Virginia, a 1979 case that held that a state judge’s findings of the factual elements of the crime for which the prisoner was committed were binding under habeas law if the state trial record would have allowed “any rational factfinder” to conclude that the elements had been proved under the applicable standard in state court.

Against this backdrop, Congress passed AEDPA in 1996 and explicitly laid out the standard for review of state court determinations of fact. Subsection (d)(2) of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 now provides that an application for habeas “shall not be granted” if a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings,” while subsection (e)(1) indicates that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the applicant “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.”

As both parties recognize, these two neighboring provisions appear somewhat internally contradictory; whereas subsection (e)(1) requires a presumption of correctness, subsection (d)(2) commands federal courts to look beneath the state court’s factual conclusions to assess the reasonableness of its factual determinations. California attempts to deal with this by suggesting that both standards should be interpreted in similar ways—i.e., pursuant to the Court’s “any rational factfinder” standard from Jackson. Thus, California would have federal courts interpret subsection (d)(2)’s reasonableness inquiry to constitute an inquiry into whether any rational fact-finder could have found the facts as the state court did. Similarly, California suggests that a criminal defendant cannot properly be said to attack the presumption of correctness under subsection (e)(1) with “clear and convincing evidence” so long as the state record contains “any substantial evidence” upon which “any rational trier of fact” could have found the facts as the state court did under the applicable burden of proof.

Under this standard, California argues that the state judgment must be affirmed because rational triers of fact could find that there was no Batson violation. Unlike Miller-El, California argues, this case presents little evidence of discrimination. Only two African-American jurors were struck, an African-American juror did sit on the case, there was no shuffling of prospective jurors, and the judge carried out the voir dire. In light of all this evidence and the explanations offered by the prosecutor, the State argues that a rational factfinder would similarly be able to find that no violation occurred.

In response, respondent argues that California’s standard conflicts with AEDPA’s plain language and the Court’s interpretation of the statute. While agreeing that the language of (d)(2) and (e)(1) are not in harmony, he argues that the proper resolution is to apply (d)(2)’s standard in cases — such as this one – in which the federal court reviews the state court’s decision solely on the record before the state court, and utilizes (e)(1)’s standard when new facts are introduced by the criminal defendant at a federal evidentiary hearing. This reading would allow the Court to read the statute according to its plain language, which does not reflect Jackson’s “any rational factfinder” standard. Instead, the federal court reviewing a state court’s determination of fact under subsection (d)(2) would simply be reviewing it for reasonability. This reading would also comport with cases like Miller-El, which suggest that reasonability, not rationality, is the touchstone inquiry. Similarly, respondent prefers that subsection (e)(1) be read as a “clear error,” rather than “rational trier of fact” standard.

Respondent argues that because he offered no new evidence on federal habeas, the Ninth Circuit’s decision should thus be affirmed pursuant to subsection (d)(2). Under that subsection, the state courts’ rulings were unreasonable because the prosecutor’s rationales were pretextual: nothing in the record suggests Juror 16 was sympathetic to persons involved with drugs or the like. The prosecutor offered up various justifications, flitting between each as the judge pierced through their legitimacy. For example, the prosecutor claimed that Juror 16 was young, but admitted to allowing other young jurors on the panel. The prosecutor then claimed that youth was but a signal for a lack of ties in the community, but this was never backed up with any objective evidence. In addition, respondent argues that the demeanor justification is not credible. The judge, who after all was in the better position to see the jurors because the judge was conducting voir dire, never witnessed the alleged flippant reaction. In light of the way that the prosecutor “trotted out” rationale after rationale, and the fact that 67% (2 of 3) African-American jurors were struck, respondent argues it was unreasonable to simply give the prosecutor the “benefit of the doubt.”

Like Miller-El, this case is significantly factbound compared to most cases the Supreme Court reviews. In combination with the fact that this case involves a Ninth Circuit vindication of a criminal defendant’s Batson rights, at the expense of comity, the Court’s grant of cert. may not bode well for respondent Collins. That said, the State of California is undoubtedly on weaker ground when it argues for the application of Jackson to AEDPA, a legal standard that no court has ever supported, than when it simply argues for a fact-bound reversal. A best guess of the outcome may therefore be a reversal on the facts, and a pyrrhic victory for respondent on the law.